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IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTIONS, THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT, AND THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS
INTRODUCTION
Aliens have long been a disadvantaged class of persons in
the United States. They have been denied the right to own
land, to seek public and professional employment, and even to
participate in the political process.' In recent years, many re-
strictions have been invalidated. Today, under constitutional
doctrine, aliens are a suspect classification in regard to state
laws and regulations, and the strict scrutiny standard is ap-
plied in the protection of their fundamental rights.' Very few
state classifications based on alienage survive such constitu-
tional scrutiny. Because the Supreme Court has been hesitant
to interfere with the plenary power of Congress over immigra-
tion and naturalization,3 aliens are not a suspect classification
under federal laws and regulations. Only the less rigorous ra-
tional relationship standard protects the rights of aliens in re-
gard to federal enactments. Concerned about the inherent in-
equities of such an approach, commentators have suggested
that a multi-variable sliding scale approach would enable the
courts to balance fairly alien rights against federal immigration
and naturalization policy interests.
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine offers a technique
to accomplish largely the same results without some of the
drawbacks of the constitutional standards under equal protec-
tion analysis. The thrust of the doctrine is to identify presump-
tions that legislatures and the Congress make in the creation
of laws and, where they are not universally true but neverthe-
less conclusive, require that they be made rebuttable. The irre-
buttable presumption doctrine would not only allow an exami-
nation of the presumptions of the lawmakers, but would also
© 1979 by Byron K. Toma.
1. K. CLAGHORN, THE IMMIGR AT's DAY iN COURT 298 (republished ed. 1971).
2. See note 4 and accompanying text infra. Under the strict scrutiny standard,
if there is a suspect classification or a fundamental interest at issue, the government
is required to demonstrate that a "compelling governmental interest" makes the classi-
fication necessary. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
3. See notes 20, 21 and accompanying text infra. Unlike the strict scrutiny stan-
dard, the traditional equal protection or "rationality" standard creates a strong pre-
sumption of constitutionality. This standard requires a challenger to "show that the
-statutory classification has no reasonable basis and enjoins the Court to assume any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could justify the classification." Note, The
Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72 Mimc. L. REV.
800, 813 (1974).
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permit speculation about the presumptions underlying classifi-
cations of persons. Unlike traditional equal protection analysis,
ad hoc application of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine to
federal alienage classifications would preserve congressional
flexibility while enabling courts to tailor justice to individual-
ized circumstances. This comment will attempt to highlight
the advantages of applying the irrebuttable presumption doc-
trine to the federal regulation of aliens.
ALIENS AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE
State Regulation of Aliens
For many years, courts did not recognize the legal rights
of aliens.' Then in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,5 the United States
Supreme Court ruled that aliens are "persons" within the pro-
tection of the fourteenth amendment. This was the first step
toward providing aliens with a legal defense against discrimi-
nation and prejudice. In subsequent cases, the Supreme
Court's recognition of aliens' rights slowly grew. For example,
in Truax v. Raich, I an alien employee was permitted to enjoin
the enforcement of a statute limiting the percentage of aliens
on the employer's work force. Nevertheless, the legal protection
accorded to aliens under the rationality standard of the equal
protection clause remained woefully inadequate. Finally, in the
landmark case of Graham v. Richardson,7 the Supreme Court
declared that aliens, like racial minorities, represent a
"'discrete and insular' minority for whom. . . heightened ju-
dicial solicitude is appropriate."' The Court in Graham ob-
served that "the power of a state to apply its laws exclusively
to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow
limits."' Recent Supreme Court decisions confirm that state
statutes which restrict the rights of aliens will be subjected to
the strict scrutiny analysis."0
4. While virtually all the protections written into the Constitution are stated in
terms of "persons" or "people" rather than citizens, these terms were not defined.
Hence, it was unclear whether aliens could be "persons" within the protections ac-
corded by the Constitution. See K. CLAGHORN, supra note 1, at 297-98; see generally
D. CARLINER, THE RIGHTS oF AUENS 11 (1977).
5. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
6. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
7. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
8. Id. at 372.
9. Id.; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948).
10. In In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), a divided Court applied the strict
scrutiny test to invalidate Connecticut's exclusion of resident aliens from the practice
of law.
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Federal Regulation of Aliens
The federal government's ability to regulate the activities
of aliens stems largely from its plenary power over immigration
and naturalization." The Supreme Court first enunciated the
congressional prerogative regarding aliens in United States v.
Macintosh,2 stating: "Naturalization is a privilege, to be
given, qualified, or withheld as Congress may determine, and
which the alien may claim as of right only upon compliance
with the terms which Congress imposes."'"
The Court continues to observe the international law con-
cept of unfettered sovereign power of federal authority over
aliens" for three reasons. First, Article I, section 8 of the Con-
stitution vests in Congress the exclusive power to regulate
immigration and naturalization throughout the United
States." Secondly, alienage has never been deemed suspect
under the equal protection clause under classifications incorpo-
rated in federal legislation." Thirdly, the Court has recognized
In Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), the Supreme Court ruled that,
pursuant to the strict scrutiny standard, a New York law providing that only American
citizens may hold permanent positions in the competitive class of the state civil service
was violative of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. Citing to Graham
v. Richardson and Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, the Court reiterated its view
that alienage is an inherently suspect classification which requires the Court to apply
a higher standard of review. Id. at 642.
In Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977), a five to four decision held unconstitu-
tional a New York statute requiring resident aliens to either apply for citizenship or,
if not qualified for it, to file a statement of intent to apply as soon as they were eligible
for citizenship in order to qualify for state financial assistance for higher education.
In following the Graham v. Richardson line of cases, Justice Blackmun's majority
opinion observed:
The Court has ruled that classifications by a State that are based on
alienage are "inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny."
In undertaking this scrutiny, "the governmental interest claimed to jus-
tify the discrimination is to be carefully examined in order to determine
whether that interest is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be
made whether the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and
precisely drawn." Alienage classifications by a State that do not with-
stand this stringent examination cannot stand.
432 U.S. at 7 (citations omitted).
11. For a discussion examining the federal government's plenary power over
immigration and naturalization, see Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Naturali-
zation Power, 80 YALE L.J. 769 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Limitations
on the Naturalization Power].
12. 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
13. Id. at 615.
14. Constitutional Limitations on the Naturalization Power, supra note 11, at
770.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, provides: "The Congress shall have Power. ...
To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization .. "
16. While the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has been
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the importance of allowing the executive and legislative
branches substantial freedom in establishing regulations over
aliens. '7
A double standard seems to exist, resulting in a more leni-
ent judicial scrutiny over federal alienage classifications than
that imposed on the states. This double standard is demon-
strated by comparing Graham, where a state statute was chal-
lenged, to Mathews v. Diaz,'" which involved a similar federal
law. In Graham, state statutes denying welfare benefits to
aliens failing to meet durational residence requirements were
invalidated.'" By contrast, in Mathews, a statute prohibiting
federal medical insurance benefits to aliens who had not re-
sided in the United States for at least five years was upheld. 0
As Justice Stevens observed: "It is unquestionably reasonable
for Congress to make an alien's eligibility depend on both the
character and the duration of his residence."'" While not
stated, it is clear the Court acted out of deference to the broad
power of Congress over naturalization and immigration.22
The Case for Intensified Protection of Aliens in Regard to
Federal Law
A strict scrutiny standard of review should be applied to
incorporated into the fifth amendment, the strict scrutiny standard has only been
applied to classifications which are suspect for federal purposes. Those classifications
are race and national origin. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 84 (1971)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1964).
17. As the Supreme Court observed in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.
88, 100 (1976): "[Tihere may be overriding national interests which justify selective
federal legislation that would be unacceptable for an individual State." The import-
ance of the federal government's control over immigration and naturalization to the
national interest was spelled out by Russell W. Davenport, former editor of Fortune
magazine, who testified before the President's Commission on Immigration and Natu-
ralization:
Nothing perhaps has affected the world standing of the United
States so deeply, in so many ways, over so long a period as its immigra-
tion policy. . . .Moreover, as we look toward the future, our immigra-
tion policy appears to become more important, rather than less. We are
a symbol of freedom and the world looks to us to define in concrete ways
how freedom can be achieved. Our immigration policy is vital to that
definition.
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME
48 (1953).
18. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
19. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
20. 426 U.S. at 69-70 (1976).
21. Id. at 83.
22. Id. at 79-80.
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federal as well as state laws and regulations limiting the rights
of aliens. The rationale behind the application of the strict
scrutiny' standard to aliens was recognized by the California
Supreme Court even prior to Graham. In Purdy & Fitzpatrick
v. State,13 the California Supreme Court took judicial notice of
the fact that aliens are the victims of prejudice. The court there
observed that because aliens are denied the right to vote, they
lack the most rudimentary means of dealing with the political
process." In addition to their political powerlessness, aliens are
largely a friendless and politically unpopular group.
Similarly, in Furuki v. Rogers,25 a federal court observed
that the strict scrutiny test is "the means by which the judici-
ary ensures that . . . laws represent more than an official ex-
pression of naked prejudice."2 In Furuki, the court struck
down a federal statute imposing a ten-year residency require-
ment on naturalized citizens who sought appointments as for-
eign service officers. The court observed that such classifica-
tions, like those based on race or nationality, stem from preju-
dice against, and subjugation of, ill-represented minority
groups.27
Arguably, deportation and naturalization involve such
fundamental interests that this factor alone should trigger the
use of strict scrutiny in testing the constitutional validity of
alienage classifications. 8 Nevertheless, it is essential to recall
the result of applying the strict scrutiny standard to federal
alienage laws: the government would be saddled with the diffi-
cult task of proposing plausible compelling interests that would
be furthered by such discrimination. Since discrimination
would additionally have to be necessary to that interest, a
showing would have to be made that the statute was precisely
23. 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969).
24. Id. at 580, 456 P.2d at 654, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 86. A commentator has observed:
The lack of the franchise distinguishes aliens from other "suspect"
classes. Without the vote, the alien cannot effect political change, he
cannot bring his case before legislative assemblies, and he is deprived of
the "remedial channels of the democratic process." Because he lacks
any voice in the political arena, it is especially important that the alien
be heard in the courtroom.
Comment, Federal Civil Service Employment: Resident Aliens Need Not Apply, 15
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 171, 180 (1977).
25. 349 F. Supp. 723 (D.D.C. 1972).
26. Id. at 728.
27. Id. at 729.
28. Constitutional Limitations on the Naturalization Power, supra note 11, at
795-96.
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drawn to serve the government's legitimate objectives."9 These
requirements would be virtually impossible for the federal gov-
ernment to satisfy.30 Hence, the strict scrutiny standard would
undoubtedly strike down nearly all federal alienage laws.3' This
result is unmanageable. It has been argued that "the federal
government is invested with a special responsibility for the
regulation of aliens in our society and this responsibility can
hardly be dismissed . . .by focusing concern on the alien's
rights as opposed to the government's interests." 32
It has been suggested that "the substantial means test"
might accommodate the competing governmental and individ-
ual interests concerned when federal legislation affecting aliens
is at issue."
While the four-sided balancing test might be well-suited
to gauging the proper degree of scrutiny an alien's care deserves
according to the degree that a federal law concerns immigra-
tion and naturalization policy, the infrequently invoked irre-
buttable presumption analysis may afford Congress greater
freedom in establishing classifications by alienage while insur-
ing the alien a heightened protection of his rights.
THE IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION DOCTRINE AND FEDERAL
REGULATION OF ALIENS
The Nature of the Irrebuttable Presumption Analysis
The exact nature of the irrebuttable presumption analysis
as a standard of judicial review is unclear. Some commenta-
tors regard it as a disguised form of an equal protection analysis
applying an extraordinarily strict standard of review." Others
29. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (striking down Tennessee's
residency requirements of 1 year in the state and 3 months in the county for voter
registration).
30. The government has rarely been able to meet its strict scrutiny burden, and
then it has only been under very exceptional circumstances. In Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Supreme Court upheld restrictions on persons of
Japanese ancestry during World War II because of "circumstances (of] the direst
emergency and peril." Id. at 220.
31. While strict scrutiny requires that a classification must be necessary to a
compelling governmental objective, Justice Marshall has observed that alienage is "in
most circumstances irrelevant" to any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose.
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105 (1973) (dissenting
opinion).
32. Note, Aliens and the Federal Government: A Newer Equal Protection, 8 U.
CAL. D. L. REv. 1, 15 (1975).
33. Id. at 24-25.
34. G. GUNTHER, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 892 (9th ed. 1975); Note, Irrebuttable Pre-
sumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449, 473 (1975); see generally Note,
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believe the irrebuttable presumption doctrine is merely a fa-
cade for substantive due process analysis. 5 A non-comparative
description by one commentator stated:
When a statutory provision imposes a burden upon a class
of individuals for a particular purpose and certain individ-
uals within the burdened class are so situated that burden-
ing them does not further that purpose, then the rigid sta-
tutory classification must be replaced, to the extent ad-
ministratively feasible, by an individual factual determi-
nation that more accurately selects the individuals who are
to beat the statutory burden. The legislature in such cases
is said to have "conclusively presumed" that all members
of the burdened class possess those characteristics that
caused the burden to be imposed, and due process is found
to require an individual opportunity to rebut this pre-
sumption."
A vital distinction between the irrebuttable presumption
doctrine and both equal protection and substantive due process
analysis is that the latter two approaches strike down congres-
sional classifications while the irrebuttable presumption doc-
trine does not.
Irrebuttable presumption analysis allows a party to dem-
onstrate on which side of a classification (s)he should fall. In
short, evidence is allowed in to rebut the presumption.3 7
Cases show that where the irrebuttable presumption ap-
proach is successfully applied, the classification is initially
struck down completely.38
Thus, a logical interpretation of the doctrine is that it
strikes down the presumption if found unconstitutional or only
indirectly strikes down the classification because of its deriva-
The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARv. L. Rzv. 1534,
1535-36 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Presumption Doctrinel. Gunther sees the irre-
buttable presumption doctrine as an extraordinarily strict variety of "means" scrutiny
because of the Vlandis complaint that the "presumption" there was "not necessarily
or universally true in fact." G. GUNTHER, supra, at 892.
35. Sewell, Conclusive Presumptions and/or Substantial Due Process of Law, 27
OKLA. L. REv. 151, 159 (1974). Sewell has observed that the language of the Court in
irrebuttable presumption cases like Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), bears a
strong resemblance to substantive due process argumentation. Id.
36. Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due
Protection?, 72 MICH. L. Rzv. 800 (1974).
37. See generally Comment, In re Lisa R. -Limiting the Scope of the Conclusive
Presumption Doctrine, 13 SAN DtEco L. REV. 377, 384 (1976).
38. See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (irrebuttable presumption of
non-residency for tuition purposes); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murray, 413
U.S. 508 (1973i (conclusive presumption that a household is not needy when tax de-
duction taken for benefit of a parent in a prior year for purposes of Food Stamp Act).
19791
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tion from the invalid presumption. Hence, it appears that once
a classification is struck down by the irrebuttable presumption
technique, Congress is not precluded from reviving that same
classification provided the presumption intimately tied to the
classification is made rebuttable. One commentator has de-
scribed this approach as follows:
The government would not have to prove that it was
employing the least restrictive alternative, nor would the
government have to show that the classification served a
compelling interest. Instead, the focus would be on the
means utilized by the government in furtherance of its
legitimate governmental interest. The government's quan-
tum of proof in sustaining its means would be based on the
balancing of four factors: the character of the classifica-
tion; the individual interests affected; the government in-
terests asserted in support of the classification; and the
proximity of these governmental interests to the constitu-
tional mandate of the Congress to control immigration and
naturalization policies.
In balancing these factors, the initial emphasis would
be placed on the proximity of the classification to immi-
gration and naturalization policies. The closer the classi-
fication is to immigration and naturalization, the more
deference the court will give to the government's ration-
ale. And conversely, the further the classification is from
immigration and naturalization, the higher the burden
will be on the government to come forth with factually
demonstrable reasons which substantially support the
means in terms of the ends. It is the balancing of the prox-
imity of the classification to immigration and naturaliza-
tion policies which provides the necessary flexibility to
the government while affording sufficient protection to the
constitutional rights of aliens."9
Another commentator views the irrebuttable presumption
doctrine as a product of the interplay between the substantive
and procedural aspects of due process, stating: "[Tihe doc-
trine rejects the conclusiveness of the presumption embodied
in the statute if the presumed fact is not universally true. ...
The basis of the defect is substantive; the relief is proce-
dural."" This characterization seems accurate.
39. Note, supra note 32, at 24-25.
40. Comment, supra note 37, at 384.
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The Development of the Irrebuttable Presumption Analysis
The use of the irrebuttable presumption analysis as a tech-
nique of judicial review began in the 1920's.4' While the tech-
nique flourished for a while, it had its share of influential de-
tractors and soon outlived its popularity.42 Until the 1970's, the
doctrine lay dormant as a largely discredited approach." Then,
in a series of cases challenging state statutes, Bell v. Burson,"
Stanley v. Illinois," and Vlandis v. Kline," the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine was revived.
The United States Supreme Court first employed the irre-
buttable presumption doctrine as a means of reviewing federal
legislation in United States Department of Agriculture v.
Murry.7 At issue was the constitutionality of a 1971 amend-
ment to the federal Food Stamp Act of 196411 providing that:
41. G. GUNTHER, supra note 34, at 888; Sewell, supra note 35, at 152.
42. The principal opponents of the irrebuttable presumptions approach during
the 1920's and 1930's were Brandeis, Holmes and Stone. G. GUNTHER, supra note 34,
at 888-89.
43. Sewell, supra note 35, at 152.
44. 402 U.S. 535 (1971). In Bell, the State of Georgia mandated that an unin-
sured motorist involved in an accident have his license suspended unless a bond was
posted to cover the damages of the aggrieved parties. While not making explicit refer-
ence to the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, the Court held on procedural due pro-
cess grounds "that under Georgia's present statutory scheme, before the State may
deprive petitioner of his driver's license and vehicle registration it must provide a
forum for the determination of the question whether there is a reasonable possibility
of a judgment being rendered against him as a result of the accident." Id. at 542.
45. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). In Stanley, an Illinois statute provided that the children
of unmarried fathers, upon the death of the mother, were to be declared state wards
and placed in guardianship, without any hearing on parental fitness and without proof
of neglect. Applying equal protection reasoning, which alluded to procedural rights,
the Court held that "all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on
their fitness before their children are removed from their custody." Id. at 658.
46. 412 U.S. 441 (1973). In Vlandis, Connecticut had enacted a statute requiring
nonresidents enrolled in the state university system to pay a higher rate of tuition and
fees than state residents. The statute raised an irrebuttable presumption that students
were nonresidents for tuition purposes as long as they attended the state university if
the legal address of a married student was outside the State at the time of application
for admission or, if a single student was outside the State at some point during the
preceding year. Id. at 442-43. While the Court acknowledged that a state has a legiti-
mate interest in protecting and preserving its university system and the right of bona
fide residents to attend their state university on a preferential tuition basis it struck
down the durational residence requirement. The Court held "that a permanent irre-
buttable presumption of nonresidence-the means adopted by Connecticut to preserve
that legitimate interest-is violative of the Due Process Clause, because it provides no
opportunity for students who applied from out of State to demonstrate that they have
become bona fide Connecticut residents." Id. at 453.
47. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
48. Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2026 (1976). The
challenged amendment was merely one of several which were prompted by the concern
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Any household which includes a member who has
reached his eighteenth birthday and who is claimed as a
dependent child for Federal income tax purposes by a tax-
payer who is not a member of an eligible household, shall
be ineligible to participate in any food stamp program...
during the tax period such dependency is claimed and for
a period of one year after the expiration of such tax pe-
riod. 11
The Court acknowledged that congressional intent was to pre-
vent non-needy households from participating in the food
stamp program which Congress viewed as being abused by
"college students" and the "children of wealthy parents." 0 The
Court, however, found the presumption under these circum-
stances highly questionable:
We have difficulty in concluding that it is rational to
assume that a child is not indigent this year because the
parent declared the child as a dependent in his tax return
for the prior year. . . . We conclude that the deduction
taken for the benefit of the parent in the prior year is not
a rational measure of the need of a different household
with which the child of the tax-deducting parent lives and
rests on an irrebuttable presumption often contrary to
fact."
Hence, the Court found the statute unconstitutional as a viola-
tion of due process. 2
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur3 was the great-
est step toward establishing the legitimacy of the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine as a constitutional approach. There the
Court dealt with state administrative regulations requiring
that pregnant teachers take a mandatory maternity leave with-
out compensation several months prior to the child's antici-
pated date of birth. The Court observed that the regulations
spawned irrebuttable presumptions of disability which were
not necessarily true.5 The Supreme Court held
that the mandatory termination provisions of the Cleve-
that too many non-needy households were participating in the program. Another
amendment was struck down on traditional equal protection grounds. See United
States Dep't Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
49. Act of Jan. 11, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-671, § 4, 84 Stat. 2048 (7 U.S.C. § 2014(b)
(1970)).
50. 116 CONG. Rac. 41979 (1971).
51. 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973).
52. Id. at 509, 514.
53. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
64. Id. at 632-33.
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land Chesterfield County maternity regulations violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, be-
cause of their use of unwarranted conclusive presumptions
that seriously burden the exercise of protected constitu-
tional liberty."
Although concurring in the result, Justice Powell ex-
pressed reservations about the ramifications of the revived irre-
buttable presumption doctrine. He warned that the approach,
if adopted consistently, would hamper all congressional power
to legislate through classifications."
Justice Powell's apprehensions seem to have fore-
shadowed Weinberger v. Salfi,57 where the Court sought to
limit the scope of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine so as
to make it more acceptable as a serious approach to the review
of federal regulations. In Salfi, the district court had invalida-
ted duration-of-relationship Social Security eligibility require-
ments for the wives and stepchildren of deceased wage earners.
However, the Supreme Court reversed, observing that:
There is . . .no basis for our requiring individualized de-
terminations when Congress can rationally conclude not
only that generalized rules are appropriate to its purposes
and concerns, but also that the difficulties of individual
determinations outweigh the marginal increments in the
precise effectuation of congressional concern which they
might be expected to produce.58
The Supreme Court's balancing test for the application of
irrebuttable presumption analysis to federal laws was further
refined in Knebel, Secretary of Agriculture v. Hein.5 Pursuant
to the Food Stamp Act of 1964,0 low income households, as
defined by federal and state regulations, could buy food stamps
at a discount. The appellee brought suit because transporta-
tion allowances were treated as income.' The district court
invalidated that regulation since it reasoned transportation
grants do not increase food purchasing power. However, the
Supreme Court reversed, observing that to allow "a deduction
55. Id. at 651.
56. Id. at 652.
57. 424 U.S. 749 (1975).
58. Id. at 785.
59. 429 U.S. 288 (1977).
60. Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2026 (1976).
61. No specific deduction was allowed for transportation allowances. Instead,
there was a standardized deduction of 10% of the wages or training allowance which
was intended to cover all incidental expenses. 429 U.S. at 293-94.
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for all transportation expenses would create significant admin-
istrative costs as well as risks of disparate treatment." 2 The
Court, considering these factors in its balancing test, declined
to find any conclusive presumptions embodied in the regula-
tion. 3
In a more recent case, Elkins v. Moreno,'4 the Supreme
Court had an opportunity to apply the irrebuttable presump-
tion doctrine to a case directly involving alien rights. Non-
immigrant alien students claimed that the University of Mary-
land had raised an irrebuttable presumption of non-domicile
against them. The district court granted relief, holding that
such an irrebuttable presumption violated the due process
clause. The court maintained that there were reasonable alter-
native procedures available to make the domicile determina-
tion, citing Vlandis v. Kline. The court of appeals affirmed.
In response to the petitioner's claim that Salfi and its
progeny overruled Vlandis, the Supreme Court made a quick
sidestep past the issue of Vlandis' continuing vitality. It
found no necessity to make a constitutional decision and dis-
posed of the issue on federal statutory and state common law
grounds. The Court noted: "If G-4 aliens cannot become domi-
ciliaries, then respondents have no due process claim under
either Vlandis or Salfi for any 'irrebuttable' presumption
would be universally true. [i.e., G-4 aliens cannot become do-
miciliaries]."I5 Hence, the Supreme Court declined to employ
the irrebuttable presumption analysis in the defense of alien
rights for the present.
The foregoing synopsis suggests that irrebuttable pre-
sumption analysis could emerge as a viable judicial mechanism
for addressing a challenge of federal laws or regulations on due
process grounds. However, the Court is reluctant to employ the
doctrine unless it perceives a serious threat to individual rights
62. Id. at 295.
63. Id. at 297. Clearly, the Court was concerned about the irrebuttable presump-
tion doctrine interfering excessively with administrative discretion. The Court, in cit-
ing to Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973), in a footnote,
observed:
That some other remedial provision might be preferable is irrelevant. We
have consistently held that where reasonable minds may differ as to
which of several remedial measures should be chosen, courts should defer
to the informed experience and judgment of the agency to whom Congress
delegated appropriate authority.
Knebel, Secretary of Agriculture v. Hein, 429 U.S. at 294 n.14.
64. 435 U.S. 647 (1978), rev'g, 556 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1977) (without opinion)
(affirming 420 F. Supp. 541 (D. Md. 1976)).
65. Id. at 661 (explanatory parenthetical added).
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and then only when those rights are balanced against govern-
mental interests.
Exploring the Asserted Weaknesses of the Irrebuttable
Presumption Approach
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine has been criticized
on four grounds. First, detractors of the doctrine argue that all
issues involving potential unfair classifications could trigger
irrebuttable presumption analysis." Basically, this danger is
no more serious than the threat that the Court could apply
strict scrutiny analysis to all issues involving a potential depri-
vation of important rights under the fundamental rights
strand of equal protection analysis. In both instances, judicial
restraint is a key factor in preventing abuse of the doctrine in
question. 7 Recent cases, 8 for example, demonstrate that
the Court is using the utmost judicial restraint regarding the
irrebuttable presumption approach.
Secondly, it is argued that the use of irrebuttable pre-
sumption analysis clashes with the premise that we are gov-
erned by laws, not judicial action." Professor Sewell warns
that:
Carried to its logical extreme, it would dictate that govern-
mental policy be applied individually and in a judicial
fashion to each person. Of course, legislation and rule-
making cannot accommodate such a premise, as their
value lies in their ability to regulate conduct on a general
rather than an ad hoc basis."0
However, as mentioned above, the courts have not abused the
doctrine, but have been applying it only in the most flagrant
circumstances. Moreover, classifications that are struck down
on irrebuttable presumption grounds may easily be resurrected
by making the presumption stemming from the classification
rebuttable. Thus, by no means are general regulations going to
be eliminated by the use of the doctrine.
A third criticism of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine
is that when legislative intent behind an enactment is unavail-
able to the courts, "[t]he existence of a plausible purpose
66. See Presumption Doctrine, supra note 34, at 1549; Sewell, supra note 35, at
179.
67. But see Seweil, supra note 35, at 180-82.
68. See, e.g., Knebel, Secretary of Agriculture v. Hein, 429 U.S. 288 (1977);
Weinberger v. Salfi, 424 U.S. 749 (1972).
69. Sewell, supra note 35, at 184.
70. Id.
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imperfectly represented by the challenged summary classifica-
tion may thus enable the Court, via the conclusive presump-
tion analysis, to substitute in toto another criterion for the
original rulemaking body."7' In that case, judicial use of the
irrebuttable presumption doctrine would threaten to usurp
lawmaking authority. To this argument Professor Sewell has
responded that
legislators are elected on the basis of popular appeal and
political views rather than any particular sensitivity to-
ward issues of fairness and justice. . . .This is not to say
that legislatures and administrative bodies exhibit no re-
gard for basic justice in the course of their actions and
deliberations, but their focus is in different directions and
it cannot be merely assumed that their exercise of discre-
tion will be above reproach. If anyone is to provide assur-
ance in this regard, the courts are the proper organs.72
In other words, the threat of judicial interference into legisla-
tive prerogatives may not only be excusable but necessary,
provided that it is held within reasonable bounds.
Fourth, commentators attack the individualized justice of
the irrebuttable presumption approach as being unprincipled
and failing to establish clear guidelines for judicial action.73
However, there are situations in which individualized judg-
ments, free from restrictive rules, should be viewed as permissi-
ble bases for decision.7 4 In fact, the very informality of indivi-
dualized judgments may often promote the ends of justice and
fair treatment. Obsession with the formal aspects of the law
may subvert the spirit of fairness that the law must seek to
serve. As Professor Tribe observes: "It is possible to argue that
individualized and informal judgments are in some circum-
stances not only more 'enlightened' but indeed constitutionally
propelled-no less so than judgments by determinate rules are
in other circumstances."75
In summary, the alleged weaknesses of the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine are not substantial enough to outweigh
the fundamental fairness of the approach.
71. Note, supra note 34, at 459.
72. Sewell, supra note 35, at 181-82.
73. See generally Note, supra note 34, at 459.
74. See generally Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269,
284 (1975).
75. Id. at 285.
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The Justification for Requiring Rebuttable Presumptions in
the Federal Regulation of Aliens
Aliens are victims of prejudice." They are politically pow-
erless and often regarded as social inferiors." They are fre-
quently the objects of distrust and suspicion." Often with
strange sounding names, faces, and customs, they have had to
deal with the full measure of society's contempt of persons who
are different. Because of this legacy of unequal treatment,
heightened protection of aliens is justified.
Although the strict scrutiny test applied to state laws con-
taining alienage classifications seems to have adequately safe-
guarded aliens' rights, the rationality standard applied to fed-
eral laws does not provide the same measure of protection.
While the sliding scale test might strengthen alien rights in
regard to federal enactments, that approach does not seem to
have generated uniform approval.79 Thus, selective application
of the irrebuttable presumption approach may be the most
effective way to reconcile competing governmental and individ-
ual interests by bringing into sharper focus previously unexam-
ined motives and attitudes underlying federal laws regarding
aliens.
Although there is a strong need to allow the executive and
legislative branches substantial freedom in regulating aliens,N
76. M. BIRNBACH, AMERICAN POLITICAL LiFE 73 (1971). Birnbach contends that it
has been racism and Social Darwinism that has "colored our attitudes" toward immi-
grants, even those arriving from Europe. Id.
77. Birnbach observes:
Starting from the premises that personal characteristics are inherited
racially, and that races are easily distinguishable from one another, ad-
herents of Social Darwinism could argue that continued influx of inferior
races would lower the vitality of Anglo-Saxon Americans unless the latter
acted to protect themselves. It was easy to prove that Anglo-Saxons were
superior: they had established empires among the inferior races populat-
ing other continents, they had attained the apogee of democratic self-
government, they had unparalleled artistic and scientific accomplish-
ments to their credit, and they were the direct lineal descendants of the
civilizations of classical antiquity. If civilization were to continue to prog-
ress,.the barbarian hordes of the New Immigration would have to be kept
out. "The higher civilization has a moral right to trimph over the lower,
for it is in this way that the world progresses."
Id. at 74. See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, WHOM
WE SHALL WELCOME 91-97 (1953).
As to the powerlessness of aliens, see note 24 and accompanying text supra. See
also Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L.
REv. 1092, 1105 (1977).
78. M. BINACH, supra note 76, at 74.
79. Note, supra note 3, at 816.
80. Note, Alien's Right to Work: State and Federal Discrimination, 45 FoRDHAm
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it is also imperative that the federal government treat aliens
fairly.' The requirements of a flexible national policy demand-
ing freedom from restrictive doctrines must be accommodated
with an appreciative regard for the rights of the individual. The
adoption of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine may provide
an effective resolution to this problem because it manages to
accommodate both interests.
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine will leave our na-
tional policymakers free from equal protection doctrines re-
stricting the use of alienage classifications. Instead, it will pre-
serve the discretion of Congress to establish classifications
based on alienage. Upon a judicial finding that a federal law
makes unfair presumptions about aliens, the law will be invali-
dated. However, since it is the conclusive nature of the pre-
sumption made that is objectionable and not the use of the
classification itself, the law may be resurrected by making the
formerly irrebuttable presumption rebuttable.
Most important, the irrebuttable presumption analysis
facilitates the attainment of justice and fair treatment. It offers
the individual alien the opportunity to demonstrate how a law
may be unfair as applied to him or her. While resorting to equal
protection grounds to strike down a classification would free
many aliens from the task of proving individual unfairness of
a statute which has been made rebuttable, the sweeping scope
of this approach prevents it from being a popular technique of
remedying the injustice of federal legislation in light of its costs
to effective national policy. In contrast, the ad hoc nature of
the irrebuttable presumption doctrine makes it very suitable in
immigration and naturalization matters.
Another advantage of the irrebuttable presumption tech-
nique is that it is a transitional solution well suited to dealing
with disputes that arise in settings of widely fluctuating be-
L. REV. 835, 848 (1977).
Indeed, as Monsignor Edward E. Swanstrom, Executive Director of War Relief
Services, National Catholic Welfare Conference, testified before the President's Com-
mission on Immigration and Naturalization:
We need an immigration program that is sufficiently elastic to enable
whatever administration may be in office to face up squarely to a domes-
tic and foreign policy which is in keeping with the position of world
leadership which the United States enjoys today. . . . Our immigration
policy has an economic, psychological and political character of an extent
that would be difficult to measure.
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME
50 (1953).
81. Note, supra note 14, at 774.
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liefs. 2 Where policymakers may be likely to change their
minds, such as in federal immigration and naturalization mat-
ters, the individual treatment involved in the doctrine has spe-
cial utility. A just result under the circumstances can be ar-
rived at, not only in terms of an individual case, but also in
terms of that time in history, since political events naturally
work into the doctrine's balancing of factors .
3
Finally, the irrebuttable presumption approach forces a
focus on many of the unexamined beliefs and attitudes under-
lying immigration and naturalization legislation. It will require
legislators to reexamine their presumptions about the existence
of alienage-linked traits," such as disloyalty,85 and other beliefs
about specific nationalities of aliens." It will allow the courts
to ferret out prejudice and antiquated notions about a class of
persons about whom inferior status and unequal treatment
have long gone unquestioned.
82. See Tribe, From Environmental Foundations to Constitutional Structures:
Learning from Nature's Future, 84 YALE L.J. 545 (1975).
83. For instance, during World War II it was generally presumed that a non-
citizen necessarily owed an affirmative duty to a foreign nation. However, as Justice
Black stated in his concurring opinion in Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 666 (1948),
several years after the war:
Loyalty and the desire to work for the welfare of the [government], in
short, are individual rather than group characteristics. An. . . alien may
or may not wish to work for the success and welfare of the state or nation.
But the same can be said of a natural born citizen.
Hence, in regard to immigration and naturalization law, where political sentiments are
likely to shift very quickly due to changes on the political scene, it would be wise to
heed Professor Tribe's warning that "perhaps only personalized justice can be accepta-
ble in settling disputes about broadly agreed-upon rights . . . in settings of widely
perceived moral flux." Tribe, supra note 82, at 555.
84. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Law, in SELECTED
ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1938-1962, at 815 (E. Barrett, Jr. ed. 1963).
85. Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek have made the following observation:
"That citizenship is a test of loyalty and alienage of disaffection, even when alienage
is coupled with ineligibility for citizenship, is a claim, as Mr. Justice Murphy observes,
'outlawed by reality.' Such 'matters of the heart are not necessarily settled by political
status.'" Id.
86. Several other beliefs that have undoubtedly colored our immigration and
naturalization laws are suggested by the historians Morison, Commager, and Leu-
chtenburg in their attempt to dispose of some misconceptions about immigration.
They observe:
Nor was there ever any ground for fearing that the 'native stock' would
succumb to the alien invasion, or that the foreign infiltration would upset
the equilibrium of the American Population. . . . Recent immigrant
stock has not shown itself less intelligent politically than the earlier stock
or less faithful to democracy. . . . That the foreign-born figures more
largely than the native-born in the statistics of crime and charity was an
index of opportunity rather than character.
1 S. MoRISON, H. COMMAGER, W. LEUCHTENBURG, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 106 (6th ed. 1969).
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CONCLUSION
For a claim to be sustained under the irrebuttable pre-
sumption doctrine, there must be a palpable unfairness in the
government's presumption, and the hardship imposed on the
individual must outweigh the governmental interest promoted
by the presumption. It appears unlikely that the Supreme
Court will invoke the irrebuttable presumption analysis unless
the balance weighs in favor of the individual and the Court
finds some difficulty in applying an equal protection analysis.
In the area of federal regulation of aliens, judicial use of
the irrebuttable presumption doctrine may best promote the
political and social interests at stake. 7 Since the doctrine
strikes down presumptions and only indirectly strikes down
classifications, Congress is not precluded from utilizing a given
classification provided the presumption underlying it is made
rebuttable. Consequently, the doctrine is far less disruptive of
congressional policymaking over immigration and naturaliza-
tion than traditional equal protection analysis. Since the ap-
proach avoids the creation of rigid doctrines, it allows the judi-
ciary to further the interests of individualized justice though
not committing itself to broad principles that may be at odds
with the interests of our foreign policy.
Byron Toma
87. The public relations interests at stake in immigration and naturalization
matters have been set forth by the President's Commission on Immigration and Natu-
ralization:
The immigration law is a yardstick of our approval of fair play. It is
a challenge to the tradition that American law and its administration
must be reasonable, fair, and humane. It betokens the current status of
the doctrine of equal justice for all, immigrant or native.
The immigration law is an image in which other nations see us. It
tells them how we really feel about them and their problems, and not how
we say we do. It is also an expression of the sincerity of our confidence in
ourselves and our institutions. An immigration law which reflects fear
and insecurity makes a hollow mockery of confident world leader-
ship. . . . [The Commission] is convinced that a full regard for protect-
ing our national security. . . can be achieved only with a positive immi-
gration policy based not on fears but on faith in the future of a democratic
and free United States.
PRESIDEr's COMM'N ON IMMiGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, supra note 80, at xiii-xiv.
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